



.The behaviorofboth policyrnakers andthe dol-
lar at the endof 1987 and the beginning of 1988
resembled their behavior surrounding the Louvre
agreement of February 1987. On both occa-
sions, policymakers in industrial countries,
responding to very sharp drops in the dollar,
expressed their desire for exchange rate stability
and a commitment to implementing policies
consistent with such stability. On both occa-
sions, their statements were initially greeted by
skepticism and a strong drop in the dollar.
Notwithstanding the initial skepticism, the dol-
lar's drop in the Spring of 1987 was followed by
a strong rebound that lasted through the sum-
mer. The rebound was triggered by massive
intervention and news about a declining trade
deficit. The decline in the dollar to post-war
lows in the last week of 1987 also was followed
by a strong recovery, in the first week ofJanuary
1988 (see Chart 1). The dollar remained above
its December lows even after the 140 point drop
in the Dow Jones Industrial Averages on January
8, and improved further on news of a sharp
reduction in the nominal trade deficit.
This Letter reviews recent efforts to stabilize the
dollar, and discusses some of the factors that
will influence its value in coming months.
Market intervention
Since the Louvre agreement, industrial countries
have adopted two sets of complementary mea-
sures to stabilize the dollar. First, they have
increased intervention in exchange markets to
levels that are unprecedented in recent years.
Second, they have made adjustments in their
economic policies to make them broadly consis-
tent with dollar stability.
The increase in the volume of intervention by
foreign governments is generally reflected in
sharp increases in their holdings of foreign
reserves because U.s. trading partners who
intervene to prevent the dollar from falling must
purchase dollars. West Germany's foreign
exchange reserves (excluding gold) rose from an
average of $39.2 billion in 1980-1985 to $61
billion.in October 1987, or 56 percent between
the two periods. Japan's foreign exchange
reserves, historically well below Germany's at
an average of $21 .4 biIIion in 1980-85, more
than tripled to $67.5 billion in October 1987. In
April 1987 alone, in the face of increasing pres-
sure on the dollar, Japan increased its reserve
holdings by an unprecedented $9.5 billion; con-
tinued intervention contributed to raising Japan's
reserves by nearly $1 biIIion a month between
July and October of 1987. Although more recent
data on reserve holdings are unavailable at this
writing, they should show further increases if
press accounts of massive intervention to sta-
bilize the dollar were correct.
Intervention has not been limited to preventing
dollar declines; it also appears to have been
timed to discourage sharp increases in the dol-
lar's value. Thus, between May and August
1987, when the dollar was appreciating, there
were reports of dollar sales by some of the cen-
tral banks of major industrial countries.
Policy stance
The durability of a stable dollar policy ultimately
depends on whether it is consistent with correct-
ing external imbalances, i.e., on whether coun-
tries will coordinate their policies to reduce the
u.s. trade deficit without further dollar deprecia-
tion. Otherwise, downward market pressures on
the dollar may be difficult to contain.
In particular, dollar stability requires changes in
the macroeconomic policies of major industrial
countries to achieve two complementary objec-
tives. The first is to reduce the u.s. external defi-
cit in a way that does not rely on continued
dollar depreciation, and the second is to keep
dollar assets more attractive than foreign cur-
rency assets. To achieve the first objective, there
must be a relative decrease in U.S. spending and
an increase in foreign spending. This can be
accomplished by tightening fiscal and monetary
policy in the u.s. compared to policy abroad.
The second objective generally means that U.S.
monetary policy must be less expansionary thanFRBSF
monetary policy abroad. This will tend to
strengthen the dollar by limiting the supply of
dollars (ratifying dollar purchases in exchange
markets by central banks) and raising domestic
interest rates above foreign rates.
In Iiliewiththis a.na.lysis,theU.S. government
committed itself at the Louvre meeting and once
again in December 1987 to reducing its budget
deficit substantially, whiIe Germany and japan
committed themselves to stimulating their
economies.
Fiscal policy in the U.S. tightened significantly
in 1987, and the federal budget deficit (on a uni-
fied budget basis) declined over $73 billion in
fiscal year 1987 to $148 billion. Further reduc-
tions of approximately $76 billion are projected
for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 (of the $76 bil-
lion, $8.5 billion are in asset sales, which have
only a limited effect on economic activity).
At the same time, there has been some fiscal
stimulus abroad. The japanese cabinet in early
june 1987 approved a 6 trillion yen (1.8 percent
ofjapan's GNP in 1986) package ofspending
increases and tax cuts to increase aggregate
spending. In December 1987, the government
committed itself to maintaining public spending
at a level at least as high as that achieved in
1987. West Germany's government deficit is
estimated at over 1% percent of GNPfor 1987,
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OEeD) projects a further rise
in Germany's deficit to 2% percent of GNP in
1989.
Notwithstanding a strong injection of dollar liq-
uidity after the stock market decline in October
1987, U.s. monetary policy last year tended to
be less stimulative than that of West Germany
and japan. A less stimulative monetary policy
stance in the u.s. relative to its trading partners
means that u.s. interest rates will tend to rise
relative to interest rates abroad. Chart 2 shows
the differentials between the three-month
eurodollar rate and the euroyen and euro-
deutschemark deposit rates. The differentials
have increased since early 1987, particularly
during periods when there was downward pres-
sure on the dollar - in the spring, early fall, and
after the stock market decline in October. The
increase in the differentials in the last two
months of 1987 was largely the result of greater
monetary stimulus abroad, particularly in West
Germany.
Nevertheless, the policies adopted by industrial
countries may not suffice to achieve a stable
dollar. Some observers contend that the pro-
jected fiscal contraction in the u.s. is too small
to guarantee a correction in the u.s. external
deficit that will prevent a further dollar deprecia-
tion. While japan's economy grew very rapidly
in the second half of 1987 (at an annualized 8.4
percent in the third quarter), over the same
period, domestic demand in Germany declined
by 112 percent. A declining population and per-
sistent unemployment dampen domestic
demand in Germany, where there are also
impediments to further fiscal stimulus.
In addition, there is noguarantee that u.s. trad-
ing partners will maintain expansionary mone-
tary policies. Japan and particularly Germany
(where money has grown over target) were
reluctant to maintain their monetary stimulus
last fall. Both raised interest rates and tested the
Louvre agreement even before the stock market
decline of October 1987. In January 1988, Ger-
many announced its intention to offset (sterilize)
the expansionary impact on the German money
supply of its intervention to support the dollar.
The policy dilemma
The uncertainty about whether the policy
changes underway will suffice to stabilize the
dollar highlights the dilemma facing policy-
makers. On the one hand, industrial countries
have two main reasons for adopting policies that
are consistent with dollar stability. First, inde-
pendent of their efforts to stabilize the dollar,
macroeconomic policies along the lines sug-
gested by the Louvre accord are good for their
economies. In the case of the U.S., a tighter
macroeconomic policy that dampens domestic
spending will help reduce an unprecedentedly
large trade deficit. In the cases ofJapan and Ger-
many, continuing economic stimulus is needed
to offset the deflationary impact of their currency
appreciation, which reduces their trade
surpluses.
Second, the governments of the major industrial
countries believe a stable dollar also is in their
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costS. The U.s. may be concerned that less stim-
ulative economic policies would lead to eco-
nomic contraction, while u.s. trading partners
fear that economic stimulus on their part may
prove inflationary. Because these concerns are
not entirely unwarranted, they tend to limit the
willingness of the industrial countries to pursue
more aggressively the policies contemplated
under the Louvre agreement.
If the measures adopted so far are sufficient to
ensure continued reduction in trade imbalances,
dollar stability might be achieved easi Iy.Other-
wise, industrial countries will have to reconsider
the extent to which they are willing to re-align
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sonsfor not wishing to rely exclusively on con-
tinued dollar depreciation to improve the u.s.
trade balance. The over-40 percent drop in the
dollar since its February 1985 peak may already
suffice to bring about significant reductions in
the real trade deficit over and above the $25 bil-
lion real improvement observed from the third
quarter of 1986 to the third quarter of 1987. Fur-
thermore, the adverse effects on economic
growth of an excessive fall in the dollar could
reduce rather than improve demand for u.s.
goods. Finally, continuing dollar depreciation
could rekindle inflation, induce a sharp rise in
U.s. interest rates by encouraging a flight from
dollar assets, and create disturbances in finan-
cial markets.
On the other hand, efforts to reduce the external
deficit and stabilize the dollar have potential
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 203,620 - 337 4,325 2.2
Loans and Leases1 6 180,486 - 395 1,488 0.8
Commercial and Industrial 50,762 - 397 - 2,463 - 4.6
Real estate 70,605 - 50 4,036 6.0
Loans to Individuals 36,331 - 11 - 4,644 - 11.3
Leases 5,827 - 2 403 7.4
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 16,092 67 2,605 19.3
OtherSecurities2 7,042 - 9 122 1.7
Total Deposits 198,959 - 5,037 - 2,373 - 1.1
Demand Deposits 47,677 - 4,164 - 1,788 - 3.6
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 32,506 272 - 13,115 - 28.7
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,621 - 564 1,024 5.5
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 131,662 - 308 - 1,609 - 1.2
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 42,691 - 620 - 4,262 - 9.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 30,168 284 - 1,616 - 5.0
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,727 220 - 6,639 - 21.8
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes u.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change